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TSB Canada: Overloaded barge led to crewmember and cargo overboard

Key considerations for mitigating accidents during fumigation

Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2025 report published by EMSA

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Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2025 report published by EMSA

[caption id="attachment_57118" align="alignright" width="365"] Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2025 report published by EMSA[/caption]

The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has published its Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2025, in which it presents statistics of marine casualties and incidents that cover the period from 1st of January 2015 to 31st of December 2024 as reported by the EU member states.

In 2024, most of the indicators, such as the number of occurrences, ships lost, fatalities or injuries, are near or below the average values for the entire period from 2015 to 2024. In 2024, 2,659 marine casualties and incidents were reported which represent a decrease of 50 compared to 2023 and an increase of 24 compared to 2022.

The total number of marine casualties and incidents reported from 2015 to 2024 was 26,751 with an annual average of 2,675. The annual average of marine casualties and incidents from 2015 to 2024 was equal to the pre-pandemic average from 2015 to 2019. The number of casualties and incidents in 2024 was 0.6% lower than the annual average in the analysed period.

After a peak of 106 very serious casualties reported in 2018 and a total of 77 in 2019, annual very serious marine casualties were on average 57 from 2020 to 2024, with a minimum of 51 in 2024, indicating a downward trend. In 2024, 2,864 ships were involved in marine casualties and incidents, a decrease of 74 ships compared to 2023, and an increase of 29 ships compared to 2022.

Between 2015 and 2024, EU Accident Investigative Bodies launched 1,123 investigations (Figure 2.4–1) and made public 950 safety investigation reports. In 2024, 60 investigations were reported to have been launched, meaning a decrease of 34.1% in comparison with 2023. It is worth noting that the number of investigations launched has been declining year by year since 2018.

Fatalities and injuries
Fatalities: From 2015 to 2024, a total of 609 lives were lost in 416 marine casualties, with a decreasing trend observed over the period. In that period, the maximum number of lives lost in passengers was reached in 2024 with a total of 6 fatalities.

Injuries: From 2015 to 2024, there were a total of 7,479 injuries resulting from 6,534 marine casualties and incidents. The average of injuries per year during this period was 748, with a minimum of 609 injuries reported in 2020. In 2024, 84.7% of the injured were crew members while the proportion of injured crew members over the entire period from 2015 to 2024 was 84.8%.

In 2024, the main events resulting in injuries were body movement under or with physical stress (generally leading to an internal injury) for occurrences with persons and collision and contacts for occurrences with ships. From 2015 to 2024, the predominant events causing injuries were falls caused by stumbling and slipping for occurrences with persons, and collisions for occurrences with ships.

Human element in marine casualties
From 2015 to 2024, 64.5% of accident events were linked to human action
50.5% of the contributing factors were related to human behaviour
When considering both, 78.8% of the investigated marine casualties and incidents involved the human element.
Safety recommendations
Over the period from 2015 to 2024, the total number of safety recommendations issued, and actions taken reported was 2,426 and 43.6% of them were dealing with ship related procedures.

Read the report: [download id="957"]

The post Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2025 report published by EMSA appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

CEO blog: October 2025

Dear colleague Wherever I go these days – and I have been around a bit recently – and whoever I meet in the maritime world, be they small craft or commercial ship surveyors, loss prevention executives, insurers and underwriters, and...

The post CEO blog: October 2025 appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

Key considerations for mitigating accidents during fumigation

[caption id="attachment_57152" align="alignright" width="365"] Photo credit: Gard P&I Club[/caption]

Gard P&I Club has provided key recommendations to mitigating accidents during fumigation operations, especially while in transit. Fumigation of cargo holds using aluminium phosphide tablets, which release phosphine gas, is essential to protect products from infestation and ensure they arrive in good condition. The heavier-than-air phosphine gas penetrates the cargo to eliminate insects and pests.

However, according to Gard, despite the existence of industry best practice recommendations, fumigation-related incidents continue to occur. While it remains uncertain how many fatalities could have been prevented through stricter adherence to the current IMO guidance, many incidents have been linked to the absence of vessel-specific procedures, underestimation or lack of awareness of the risks involved, or decisions influenced by commercial pressures.

The IMO best practice recommendations clearly assign primary responsibility for the fumigation process to the designated fumigator-in charge. However, the vessel operator and master remain responsible for ensuring safe working conditions onboard. Therefore, when fumigation is planned – especially if treatment will continue during the voyage – the precautions outlined in MSC.1/Circ.1264 should be reviewed and used as a basis for establishing appropriate vessel-specific safety protocols within the Safety Management System (SMS).

A checklist can be prepared using Appendix 3 of the IMO circular, Model Checklist for In-Transit Fumigation, or by referring to the Fumigation Checklist found in the Fumigation Handbook published by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

In addition, the following measures should be considered, Gard Club highlights:

- Conduct or reaffirm risk assessments, ensuring that all hazards associated with fumigated cargoes, including toxic exposure, oxygen depletion, fire, and explosion risks, are identified, addressed, and managed throughout the voyage.
- Ensure vessel-specific enclosed space registers and entry procedures clearly recognise the presence of dangerous fumigant gases as an added risk – both for cargo holds and for spaces connected to or adjacent to fumigated holds.
- Provide comprehensive general-level training to all crew members. In addition, when in-transit fumigation is planned, the fumigator-in-charge should brief all crew members directly on fumigation hazards, symptoms of exposure, and emergency actions – rather than delegating this responsibility solely to the designated vessel representatives. Ensure full attendance and understanding during safety briefings.
- Verify that emergency procedures are in place to deal with crew exposure to fumigant gases. The US CDC’s emergency response card on phosphine provides useful information. Medical officers could also consult the emergency section of the Mariners Medico Guide for up-to-date guidance on treating patients exposed to poisonous gases.
- Require thorough pre-loading gas-tightness inspections by the fumigator-in-charge, with documented results. Where gas-tightness cannot be determined with certainty, implement additional risk control measures, such as supplementary gas monitoring. After fumigant application and before disembarkation, require the fumigator-in-charge to inspect and confirm that no gas leaks are present and to formally attest that conditions onboard are safe.
- Emphasise the designated vessel representatives’ responsibility to participate in both pre-loading and post-fumigation inspections. This promotes crew awareness and familiarity with vessel conditions and potential risk areas. However, avoid placing responsibility on the master or their representatives to sign-off for gas-tightness and safe conditions, as this may create a conflict of interest.
- Implement procedures to minimise crew time spent on deck and near hatch covers during the first 24 to 36 hours after fumigation has been set – when the risk of fumigant gas explosions is highest.
- Equip vessels with reliable portable atmosphere testing instruments, fitted with sensors capable of detecting fumigant gases such as phosphine, and increase the frequency of gas checks.
- Arrange for continuous atmosphere monitoring in high-risk areas, such as spaces connected to or adjacent to fumigated cargo holds, especially if those spaces are designed for continuous occupation or are frequently accessed.
- Assess the impact of modifying or interrupting ventilation system airflow during the voyage, as such changes may increase the risk of hazardous conditions.
- Reinforce that crew should never handle fumigants. If top-up fumigation is required during the voyage (e.g. for log cargoes), request the fumigator-in-charge to sail with the vessel.
- Establish a clear company policy on the use of adequate respiratory protection for personnel that enter holds where fumigants have been present – acknowledging that hazards may persist even after a hold is certified gas free and spent fumigants have been removed, and warning crew and port workers to remain vigilant and use appropriate protective equipment until all risks are eliminated.
- Finally, company procedures should clearly state that the master has the right to refuse in-transit fumigation if it is deemed unsafe. Safety should always take precedence over commercial considerations.

The post Key considerations for mitigating accidents during fumigation appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

TSB Canada: Overloaded barge led to crewmember and cargo overboard

[caption id="attachment_57161" align="alignright" width="365"] Starboard side view of the cargo vessel Sivumut. Credit: TSB Canada[/caption]

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has published its investigation report into a overloaded barge which led to a crewmember and cargo overboard in Frobisher Bay, Nunavut in 2023 due to and overloaded barge.

What happened

On 27 October 2023, the cargo vessel Sivumut was anchored in Frobisher Bay, Nunavut, while transshipping cargo to Iqaluit, Nunavut, using barges and tugs.

During transshipment operations, the tug Qimmiq departed the Sivumut while towing the Tasijuaq barge in an alongside tow.

The barge carried 24 shipping containers with one crew member stationed atop the containers.

Shortly after the tug’s departure, the barge listed to port and began to capsize, causing the crewmember and 23 containers to fall overboard. Eight minutes later, the crewmember was retrieved from the water by the Sivumut crew and then transported to Iqaluit for medical attention. Sixteen containers were later retrieved.

The investigation

As part of its investigation, the TSB performed a stability assessment of the Tasijuaq and found that it was operating beyond its stability limits, compromising its ability to right itself. While the barge had not undergone a stability assessment, and was not required to by regulation, the company did have a structural arrangement plan indicating the maximum allowable deck load. However, this plan was kept onshore, and the limits were not communicated to the crew. Without this information, the crew relied solely on previous experience to determine safe operating limits.

The investigation also determined that procedures for transshipment operations within the company’s safety management system (SMS) were limited and dispersed across multiple documents, and that informal operational practices had developed over time, reducing safety margins.

Following the occurrence, the company took several safety actions including developing third‑party loading guides for its barges, adding a transshipment procedures manual to its SMS, and installing recovery devices on the tugs.

Read the full report: TSB Canada report M23C0305

The post TSB Canada: Overloaded barge led to crewmember and cargo overboard appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

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